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MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 17/80)



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SOCIOECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT

Moscow SOTSIAL'NO-EKONOMICHESKIYE PROBLEMY RAZORUZHENIYA; SBONNIK STATEY (Socio-economic Problems of Disarmament; Collection of Articles) in Russian 1978 signed to press 31 Oct 80 pp 1-11

[Table of contents, and introduction of booklet by the Soviet Committee to Defend the Peace, prepared for press by the Scientific Commission for Disarmament, Soviet Committee to Defend the Peace, 1100 copies, 11 pages]

[Excerpts]

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Introduction	

One of the most dangerous and most persistent myths of our time which have been artificially created by advocates of the military-industrial complexes in the West for the purpose of justifying the arms race that they are conducting is the myth concerning the impossibility of economic prosperity in the industrially developed states without a tremendous and constantly growing military budget. In addition to a noisy propaganda campaign intended to frighten broad segments of the population

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with the nonexistent "military threat" from the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, this myth is being actively used by the gigantic propaganda machine of the opponents of detente and disarmament, as a means of exerting ideological pressure in order to disorient the masses of the people and deaden their vigilance and actions in the fight to end the arms race, limit and reduce the number of arms, and the fight for universal and complete disarmament.

In this regard the attention of the peace-loving public, the role of which in the fight for the consolidation of detente is becoming more effective with every passing year, is being attracted more and more frequently by the problems that are linked with the economic and social consequences of disarmament. They, in particular, occupy an important place in the widely extended dialogue dealing with problems of detente and disarmament, which was begun in October 1973 at the World Congress of Peace-Loving Forces in Moscow and which, to this day, is continuing with the participation of representatives of various political parties, trade unions, and mass public movements that are cooperating in the system of the forum that was created by them -- the International Forum for Relations Among Peace-Loving Forces. The most thorough and most complete discussion of these problems occurred at the World Conference "In Favor of the Cessation of the Arms Race, Disarmament, and Detente," which was held in Helsinki on 23-26 September 1976. They were brought up for discussion at the international seminar "Alternatives to the Production of Arms," which was convoked by the International Forum for Relations Among Peace-Loving Forces in London, with the cooperation of the British Congress of Trade Unions and other public organizations in Great Britain. A special scientific symposium prepared by the International Peace Institute in Vienna in 1979 is devoted to them.

By way of preparation for these meetings, a group of Soviet scientists participating in the activities of the Scientific Commission on Problems of Disarmament, attached to the Soviet Committee to Defend the Peace, made an attempt to generalize and systematize certain ideas relative to the conversion of military production to peacetime purposes, as the contribution by the representatives of Soviet scientific public opinion to the discussion of this important scientific problem.

In submitting this collection of articles to the readers, the authors make absolutely no claims concerning the exhaustive exposition of the problem that has been posed. They are completely aware of the hypothetical nature of the very posing of this problem under conditions of the continuing arms race. But, at the same time, they are profoundly convinced of the necessity of extending on a broad scale the scientific research and the search for the most efficient and most effective ways and methods of converting military production to civilian needs. This research, active dissemination, and discussion of their results at various levels, in international and national organizations will undoubtedly make it possible, in the final analysis, to refute and unmask in worldwide public opinion the fictitious statements by the apologists of militarism concerning the "technical impossibility" of disarmament.

It should be taken into consideration that as of the present day, in worldwide scientific literature on this group of problems, there is a numerical predominance of works by authors who, carrying out the social mandate of the military monopolies, graphically portray the imaginary and real difficulties of conversion, intimidate the reader with the catastrophic consequences of disarmament, etc. Major corporations do not spare their funds to publish and disseminate such pseudoscientific literature. However, there exist other research studies, which are for the time being obviously in insufficient quantity but which contain a

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convincing and scientific refutation of the assertions by the apologists of the arms race. Objective researchers, completely aware of the vital importance of the problem of disarmament, indicate the economic and political means with the aid of which it is possible and necessary to achieve a change in priorities, the sharp reduction in military expenditures, the efficient use of the gigantic industrial, scientific, and human potential that is currently engaged in the production of tools of death, and to strive for the welfare of mankind as a whole. These researchers, in our opinion, deserve the most active support and encouragement on the part of the broad public and primarily on the part of the organizations and movements participating in the fight for disarmament.

When considering certain concepts espoused by foreign scientists with regard to this group of problems and when expounding their own views and evaluations, the authors proceeded from the close interrelationship and interdependence between the capabilities and the prospects for conversion with the development and deepening of the process of detente. If conversion itself is possible only under conditions of real progress and the confirmation of detente and the supplementing of it by measures of military detente, then both the development of the processes of detente, its materialization, unambiguously presuppose, in their turn, conversion, the shifting of the labor and material resources of the states from the military sphere to the civilian.

In undertaking this research, the authors were guided by the firm conviction that no difficulties or problems arising as a result of conversion, no possible socioeconomic costs, can be compared in their scope with that real loss that is inflicted by the continuing arms race, with that lethal danger that it brings to mankind. Consequently, objectively speaking, the cessation of the arms race, the conversion of the military machine to purpose civilian purposes, constitutes a vital imperative, since in our time there simply is no intelligent alternative to detente and disarmament.

An analysis of various aspects of this problem confirms the conclusion to which many objective scientists and political and public figures in various countries are coming, namely: the technical problems of conversion are no more complicated than any other tasks in the reorganization of technology and the system of economic priorities which are being successfully resolved by modern science and production. It is not the difficulties of conversion which are standing on the path of disarmament, but, rather, the resistance put up by the military-industrial complex, the lack of the necessary political will on the part of the governments that bear the responsibility for the continuation of the arms race.

Naturally, the problems of the conversion of military production are viewed variously in the socialist and capitalist countries. Socialist society consists of working classes and social groups. This society has no place for those classes or social groups that would pursue selfish goals, that would strive for social privileges at the expense of others, would strive for annexation, aggression against other nations, or would view warfare as a source of their own prosperity. This was expressed very well by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, speaking over television during a visit to West Germany in May 1978. "In our country, in the Soviet Union," L. I. Brezhnev remarked, "there are no classes, no social strata, no social groups that would have a self-interestedness in war or its preparation, that would count on using a war for their own profit. We do have, of course, military plants. We do have an army. But no one -- not the managers of those plants, not the command complement in the army, not the workers,

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not the soldiers -- none of them link their well-being with warfare, with military production orders. We would like very much -- for the tremendous advantage for society as a whole -- to switch the war plants over to the production of peacetime output, to serve peaceful creative purposes" (PRAVDA, 7 May 1978).

The posing of this problem with regard to the largest capitalist states, and primarily the United States, inevitably leads to the question of the sinister role played by the military-industrial complex, which currently has reached such a hypertrophied scope there that it is beginning, as it were, to live its own life and is threatening to become, in essence, uncontrollable. The chief difficulties in converting military production to peacetime conditions are linked there with the stubborn lack of desire on the part of the largest national and trans-national monopolies operating in that sphere to lose their source of gigantic profits, a source that is provided with governmental military orders and lavish subsidies at the expense of millions of ordinary taxpayers.

This idea was expressed very effectively by the famous American economist Professor Kenneth Bowlding in one of his statements in Congress. "The military industry," he said, "is a cancerous tumor on the body of American society. It has its own growth model. It represents a system which, practically speaking, is independent and, in fact, is objectively hostile to the welfare of the American nation, although it depicts itself as its defender" (*American Militarism 1970: A Dialogue on Distortion of our National Priorities*. New York, 1970, p 94).

Hence it evolves that a very important condition for the resolution of the problem of conversion -- as, incidentally, the entire problem of disarmament as a whole -- is the necessity of bridling the greedy strivings of the military-industrial complex. In this question also, a large and responsible role is played by all the peace-loving social forces. By the constant, persistent, and decisive efforts of political parties, parliaments, trade unions, and other mass organizations, it is necessary to strive for the reorientation of the entire socioeconomic and budgetary policy of the states. The use of the levers that already exist in the capitalist countries for exerting state influence upon the economy for the purposes of encouraging conversion is capable of facilitating that entire process, of increasing its favorable social consequences, and lessening the resistance put up by the forces that have been opposing disarmament. The system of state measures and institutions which currently is directing the growth of military production can and must be converted into a system that mobilizes the economic and scientific potential of society for the resolution of the critical problems that are confronting mankind as a whole and every nation individually. In other words, the peace-loving forces have before them today a difficult but completely attainable goal: the conversion of the military-industrial complex into a scientific-industrial complex that is oriented toward the resolution of the vitally important economic and social problems of mankind.

In this regard there also arises the question of the social danger that is represented in our day by the fact that in the United States, and in other developed capitalist countries, the gigantic production capacities intended for the production of the latest and most destructive types and systems of weapons are still concentrated, entirely or to a considerable degree, essentially in private hands, are the property of a number of the largest companies. This circumstance should not be

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ignored when analyzing the possible forms and methods of carrying out the conversion of military production.

At the same time, the extensive amount of material cited in this collection indicates that many major economists in the West, when objectively analyzing the essence of the problem, cite convincing arguments, computations, and models that attest to the reality of conversion in the capitalist countries without any major reorganization of the existing production relations.

The achievements of the human mind, the unlimited capabilities of scientific-technical progress, are currently capable of providing every nation, every family, every individual with a worthy life. But this requires eliminating once and for all the threat of war, it requires stopping the arms race and achieving real disarmament.

The cessation of the arms race would provide not only an economizing of tremendous resources for productive purposes, but also would clear the entire psychological atmosphere in the world. The spiritual life of many nations would be liberated from the pernicious influence of those forces which are living parasitically off the arms race, off the incitement of hostility and distrust among nations.

G. Lokshin, Secretary of the
Soviet Committee to Defend the
Peace

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BOOK EXCERPTS: HISTORY OF SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT

Moscow ISTORIYA SOVETSKOY VOYENNOY MYSLI. KRATKIY OCHERK. 1917-IYUN' 1941
(History of Soviet Military Thought. A Brief Outline. 1917-June 1941) in
Russian 1980 signed to press 12 Feb 80 pp 2, 3-4, 5-16, 221-234, 235-240

[Annotation, table of contents, introduction, historiography and conclusion
of book by I. A. Korotkov, Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 2,900 copies, 272 pages]

[Excerpts]

Annotation

In this book the author examines the most important directions of Soviet military thought in the 1920's and 1930's and reveals the relationship between military theory and practical defense of the socialist state. The author shows the successes of Soviet military thought in the ideological struggle against bourgeois and Menshevik-Trotskyite views on questions of military theory and practical military organizational development. This book shows how Soviet military theory was born and evolved through the efforts of V. I. Lenin, the Communist Party, military leaders, and military scientists.

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Introduction	

The Great October Socialist Revolution is the principal event of this century, which radically altered the course of development of all mankind. It awakened millions of workers to vigorous political activity and immeasurably enhanced the social role of military affairs and military theory. Interest in it was dictated by the necessity of defending the revolutionary gains from the interventionists and domestic counterrevolutionaries in 1918-1920. The victorious revolution in our country opened up a new stage in the development of Marxist military thought.

This book discusses the history of Soviet military thought from 1917. Principal attention is focused on the period between wars (1921-1941). The Soviet state, which was in a situation of hostile capitalist encirclement and counterrevolutionary

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activities by remnants of the exploiter classes within our country, directed its efforts toward overcoming the low level of development of productive resources and culture inherited from czarist Russia and the devastating consequences of World War I and the Civil War. Lenin's plan for building socialism was being implemented during these same years.

Study of the period preceding World War II and the Great Patriotic War is essential for amassing experience in readying the nation and its armed forces for defense. This task corresponds to the most important areas of development of scientific research specified by the CPSU Congress in the field of the social sciences: "Continue work on scientific synthesis of the world-historic experience of the CPSU."¹ The Communist Party possesses considerable military experience alongside its vast experience in establishment of a socialist economy, development of all areas of science, training of cadres, improving and perfecting the governmental edifice. Study of this military experience is an objective necessity for advancing theory and practice of military organizational development.

During the years in question the Soviet people "accomplished the feat of industrializing our country and collectivizing agriculture, and secured our nation's defense capability, laying a solid material and technological foundation for our victory in the Great Patriotic War."²

The following was performed in the area of military theory: investigation of the experience of World War I and the Civil War (1918-1920); study of wars and military conflicts of the 1920's-1930's; synthesis of the experience of Soviet Armed Forces field exercises and maneuvers; intent study of the development of military affairs in the armies of the capitalist countries; elucidation of possible trends in development of the means and methods of warfare, taking account of advances in science and technology. Marxist-Leninist methodology in Soviet military theory gained final victory during these years; there occurred an intensive process of formation of Soviet views on the character of a potential war and modes of utilization of armed forces branches and combat arms on the basis of the experience of World War I and the Civil War, taking account of the development of military hardware.

Investigation of military-theoretical thought in the 1920's and 1930's enables one to show that development of military affairs and military theory was influenced by modes of waging war evoked by the development of new equipment (airplanes, tanks). Changes in views which took place during those years have much in common with contemporary changes in military theory. The experience of the past can tell us much in regard to approach to solving contemporary problems of military theory and practice.

Disclosure of the process of origination and development of ideas and views in military affairs enables one more thoroughly to comprehend the experience of the military past in the interests of contemporary theory and practice of military organizational development. "...No bare conclusions," wrote F. Engels, "but on the contrary, study -- this is what we need most of all: conclusions are nothing without that development which led to them..."³

Study of the history of Soviet military-theoretical thought in the years under discussion is of great international significance. Knowledge of this history is also a very important means of developing innovative thinking in military cadres.

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The availability of sources and accumulated historiographic material⁴ makes it possible to shed more extensive light on the process of establishment and development of the most important problems of Soviet military thought in the 1920's and 1930's.

The term "voyennaya mysl'" [military thought] first appeared in Soviet military literature in 1919, when a scientific journal of the Turkestan Front, entitled VOYENNAYA MYSL', was established at the initiative of M. V. Frunze.⁵ The front revolutionary military council stated the journal's aims with extreme conciseness and brevity in a message to the readers: discussion of "all matters of a military nature as well as contiguous matters pertaining both to general and specifically eastern -- Turkestan -- affairs."⁶ The materials published in this journal were in conformity with these requirements.

Publication of this journal, covering the broad spectrum of tasks pertaining to defense of the Soviet Republic, was met by critical comments by the central military journal, involving the participation chiefly of former czarist military experts. The most negative comments were leveled at articles contained in the journal's political, economics, and technical sections. In connection with this, the editors published in the following issue articles entitled "Policies of the State and the Red Army" and "Once Again About Our Program."⁷ They presented in detail the editors' point of view on the tasks of military theory in strengthening national defense.

With reference to the experience of the imperialist world war (1914-1918) and Civil War (1918-1920), the editors persuasively argued the close link between the "firing line" (that is, armed forces operations), the nation's economy and political system. "For us," the editorial stated, "it was methodologically absolutely impossible to view a war... and with it military affairs in general, as something self-contained, bounded by the framework of 'age-old' laws of the art of warfare."⁸

The reasons why some former czarist military experts failed to comprehend the significance of the economy in preparing national defense and in the outcome of war were due to the limitedness of bourgeois military thought. The nature of wars at the beginning of the 20th century broadened the interest of military thought in questions pertaining to economics and politics, which up to that time had seemed alien "to the interests of purely military specialists."⁹

We shall note that Marxist-Leninist ideas in the military field found fullest expression in the journals published by the fronts, which were closer to the practical business of waging war. "Thick journals,"¹⁰ wrote M. V. Frunze, "laying claim to the role of Red Army central organs, had no luck with us. There is no doubt whatsoever about the fact that not a single one of them succeeded in its aim of becoming the sole center of military-scientific thought."¹¹ This situation, in Frunze's opinion, reflected a certain stage in the development of our army: the insufficient theoretical training of young military cadres (they were in the process of growth), and the former czarist experts lagging behind the demands of the new conditions of preparing for and waging war.

Publication of the new central military journal VOYNA I REVOLYUTSIYA [War and Revolution] (published in 1925-1936) constituted an attempt fully to implement the idea advanced by Frunze as early as 1919. The journal pursued the task of "uniting behind it all the scientific research people for resolving the problems of defense

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of the Soviet Union and combat training of the army. It was to become a vehicle of theoretical guidance of military-scientific activity both within and outside the military.¹² Subsequently, in 1945, the central journal was given instructions to elaborate a broad range of problems.¹³

Thus the term "military thought" encompassed a broad range of questions pertaining to national defense, which went beyond the framework of military science.

The subject of investigation, however, in history of military thought has not yet been finally and definitively formulated. Definition of the subject of history of social thought, of which history of military thought is a part, is in approximately the same situation. Several studies on history of social thought have been published in recent year,¹⁴ but no final, definitive definition of its subject has been formulated up to the present time. At present the opinion is stated that it encompasses the social sciences in its investigation: history of philosophy, political economy, law, etc. It is believed that elaboration of this problem is internally linked with history of the various sciences.¹⁵ In 1977 the opinion was published that social thought is a broader field than social science.¹⁶

Cognizant of the complexity of producing a study of the history of Soviet military thought in the period 1917-1941, the author has not set for himself the goal of encompassing all problems elaborated during this period. The task is limited to the examination of two groups of problems.

1. Investigation of the process of origination and development of the leading, currently vital problems of military theory: determination of the character of a potential war and its initial period; probable employment of armed forces branches and combat arms; the character of future operations and elaboration of a scientifically substantiated approach to determination of the time of transition by the war economy to series production of new weapons and other military equipment; significance of the experience of wars in Soviet military theory.

2. Trace the process of mastering of Marxism-Leninism by scientific cadres applicable to military theory and practice; show the struggle between Marxist-Leninist military thought and bourgeois "leftist"-Trotskyite and other anti-Marxist views; enlistment of former czarist military experts into the service of the Soviet Government and their reeducation, and the forming of young scientific cadres.

The above-enumerated items make it possible to show the principal areas and directions of formation and development of Soviet military thought in the area of formulation, discussion and resolution of the major problems of national defense. Since military thought is a part of social thought, the general methodological principles of investigation employed in the social sciences fully apply to military thought as well.

One of the principal demands of historical materialism is a class approach to study of historical phenomena. Marxist-Leninist historical science openly declares its partisanship, demanding in any appraisal of events "direct and open adoption of the viewpoint of a specific social group."¹⁷ Applied to history of Soviet military thought, this signifies elucidation first and foremost of the objective socio-economic and political preconditions for development of military theories and views in each period of investigation.

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Studying the process of formation and development of military thought, it is essential to bear in mind those fundamentally new conditions of its development which were created as a result of the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, to approach from a Marxist-Leninist position problems of war, the army, military affairs, training of military-scientific cadres, etc.

In investigating the process of formation and development of Soviet military thought, we were guided by the Leninist thesis on the necessity of taking account of the struggle of ideas and views. In his review of N. A. Rubakin's "Sredi knig" [Among Books], V. I. Lenin came out against the author's assertion that polemics obscures the truth, as it were, by means of various emotions. Substantiating his disagreement with this statement, he wrote: In the first place, "without human emotions there has never been, there is not now and there cannot be human seeking of the truth," and in the second place, the author "wishes to present a survey of the 'history of ideas,' but the history of ideas is the history of the succession and, consequently, the struggle of ideas."¹⁸

It follows from this that in analyzing the development of Soviet military thought there is no need to "improve" or "worsen" its history, to conceal or embellish certain events. V. I. Lenin warned against subjectivism and arbitrariness in appraising events of the past. "The point is not," he wrote, "who 'examines' and who 'is interested,' but what is, independent of human consciousness."¹⁹ Ignoring the difficulties of the traveled path only depreciates the significance of what has been accomplished by the Communist Party and Soviet people, and consequently has a negative effect on the scientific value of research.

Inherent in the development of Soviet military thought is an inseparable link with the practical means of defense of the achievements of the October Revolution and strengthening of the defense capability of what at that time was the only socialist nation, under conditions of hostile capitalist encirclement. Synthesis of the experience of wars and military conflicts was performed for the purpose of defense of this country against aggression. All this should be taken into account when studying the history of Soviet military thought.

In studying this problem it was borne in mind that changes in military-theoretical views do not occur simultaneously, on command, but rather in the course of struggle between old and new ideas. In the book "Gosudarstvo i revolyutsiya" [State and Revolution] V. I. Lenin wrote: "...Life shows us remnants of the old and the new at every step, both in nature and in society."²⁰ Development of Soviet military thought at all these stages confirms the Leninist thesis on the inevitability of a struggle between old and new ideas and views. Therefore the history of military thought should reveal the character of this struggle, its dynamism and thrust in every period of its development. This makes it possible more precisely and accurately to elucidate the points of transition by military thought to a new qualitative level in its development and to find turning points in change in the problems of military-theoretical investigations, caused by social changes in the country's societal affairs and by the development of new weaponry.

Development of theory possesses certain relative independence. "...An ideologist..." wrote F. Engels, "has at his disposal in each field of science certain material which was formed from the thinking of previous generations and traveled its own independent path of development in the intellect of these generations, one following the other."²¹

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And although Soviet military thought was from the very beginning of its development grounded on totally different methodological principles from bourgeois military thought, it could not be created without knowledge amassed by previous generations. In the 1920's attitude toward the military past was one of the critical problems in all areas of Soviet theory and practice.

V. I. Lenin condemned a nihilist attitude toward the past: "It is not bare negation, not empty negation, not skeptical negation, vacillation, and doubt which is characteristic and intrinsic in dialectics -- which unquestionably contains the element of negation, which is a very important element -- no, it is negation as an element of linkage, as an element of development, with retention of the positive, that is, without any vacillations, without any eclecticism."²²

Investigation of the history of Soviet military thought obliges the historian to be guided by the Leninist thesis on the relativity of all knowledge and absolute content at each step of cognition.²³ According to Lenin, to reproduce the essence of investigated events means to show them in conformity with history. The end result of study of the history of military thought should not be in photography of the content of military theories and views (this is the initial stage of the task) but in revelation of historical truth, in its movement and development. "The movement of scientific cognition -- that is the heart of the matter," commented V. I. Lenin in his notes on Hegel's "Science of Logic."²⁴ In other words, each theoretical conclusion, each theoretical thesis or hypothesis can possess scientific value only as a result of precise determination of their place in the development of military thought of the given period.

But what is the criterion for determining the place of specific theories in the overall process of development of military thought? We know that not every idea develops military thought. In our view an objective appraisal of the significance of a given military theory or individual points of a given military theory, points which have been confirmed by practical military organizational development in peacetime and practical military operations in time of war, constitute such a criterion. Consequently, in determining the place of specific theories in the general process of development of military thought it is necessary to specify those theories, ideas and views which comprise an important stage in the process of cognition of the phenomena of warfare and military affairs as a whole. One should not forget, however, that the dialectics of cognition contain, as V. I. Lenin noted, a great many shadings of every approach and approximation to actuality.²⁵ This signifies that, alongside theories representing specific points of advance in the development of military thought, there have also been theories which, although not possessing exceptional vitality, have helped military thought move forward in elaboration of problems.

Investigating the history of Soviet military thought, we turn to the productive activities of military establishments, educational institutions and organizations, political and military leaders, military theorists, historians and philosophers participating in the development of military theory. It is very important to find a correct criterion for assessment of their activities. In this case one must follow the Lenin thesis stated in "A Description of Economic Romanticism" (1897). Criticizing the Russian Sismondists who, in place of a scientific analysis of capitalism, analyze the petit-bourgeois utopias of Sismondi (1773-1842), V. I. Lenin wrote: "Historic merits are judged not by what historical figures did not give in comparison to contemporary demands, but by what new things they did give in comparison with their predecessors."²⁶

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This Leninist approach is fully applicable to appraisal of the achievements of Soviet military thought of the 1920's and 1930's as a whole and the merits of the military leaders and theorists of that time, in particular their contribution to development of military thought.

In investigating the history of Soviet military thought of the 1930's, the author was guided by the party's instructions on avoiding extremes in interpreting the events and phenomena of those years. One extreme, stated the Central Committee Report to the 24th CPSU Congress, is "reducing the great diversity of today's Soviet realities to problems which have been irrevocably pushed into the past as a result of the work done by the party to overcome the consequences of the cult of personality. Another extreme... is attempts to whitewash phenomena of the past, which the party subjected to resolute and high-principled criticism, and to preserve concepts and views which run contrary to the new and innovative elements which the party has introduced into its practical and theoretical activities in recent years." Both extremes depreciate "the significance of what has already been accomplished by the party and people."²⁷

A scientific approach to study of the history of military thought is grounded on investigation of the foundation of accurate and undisputed facts. "...In any scientific field -- both in the field of nature and in the field of history -- one must proceed," wrote Engels, "from the facts we have been given...."²⁸ At the same time he drew attention to their evaluation. In his military-historical essay entitled "The Armies of Europe," F. Engels wrote: "...A correct evaluation of facts is the sole guiding principle...."²⁹

But the entire point is how facts are to be selected, how their relationship and interlink are to be established, to ensure that this is an effective foundation for investigation of historical events. V. I. Lenin counseled "taking not separate facts but the entire aggregate of facts pertaining to the matter being examined, without a single exception...."³⁰ Stressing the importance of dealing correctly with facts, V. I. Lenin cautioned against citing certain individual facts solely for the purpose of presenting examples and explained that arbitrarily selected facts can, in place of an objective disclosure of the historical relationship and interdependence of phenomena, create a "subjective" concoction "for justification of what is perhaps a dirty business."³¹ Inclusion of a large number of facts and establishment of their relationship is essential for elucidating the leading trend in historical development and establishment of recurrence and the typical in development, in order to separate out the random from the essential in this process.

The breadth and diversity of included facts depends first of all on available sources -- the research base. The most important sources for studying history of Soviet military thought are the documents of party congresses, decrees of CPSU Central Committee plenums and the Soviet Government on military matters, orders of the USSR People's Commissar (Minister) of Defense, directives of the General Staff, and other official documents which define the tasks of military theory and assign it specific problems for research and investigation. Of great importance are statements by political and military leaders on matters pertaining to war and military affairs. Collective-authorship documents constitute important sources for investigation of the development of military thought -- regulations, field manuals and guides, which reflect the aspect of military theory in the practical training and preparation of armed forces for the conduct of combat operations.

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Questions pertaining to development of military thought are reflected both in problem-oriented studies by scientific teams of military theorists, historians and philosophers, and in single-author studies. In addition, research materials can also include scholarly articles published in military periodicals,³² and military memoirs. The above-enumerated sources form a solid factual basis for study of the history of military-theoretical thought.

Also of fundamental significance for this research is elucidation of the question of citing the works of military theorists. In the preface to the third edition of "Das Kapital," F. Engels discusses in a fair amount of detail the method of citation and quotation employed by Marx. F. Engels specifies two cases of reference to citations: first, in presenting or describing events, when citations are a simple reference to a document; second, when it is necessary to designate the place, time and name of the author of specific views. "Here the citation should only establish where, when and by whom a given idea comprising a certain stage in the development of economic teachings was clearly stated for the first time. Only one thing would be indicated: that a given economist's view has significance for the history of science..."³³ Engels considered such a citation to be essential in investigations.

Practical conclusions proceed from the above: it is necessary to cite those military scientists whose ideas were of importance for their time. This of course does not mean that in research and investigation one can give reference only to leading views; it is also necessary to critique erroneous ideas, with indication of specific works. One should also specify those works, when, and under what conditions specific ideas were stated in various areas of military affairs.

In this brief essay we have presented the history of Soviet military thought over a span of almost 25 years. We have endeavored to reconstruct the process of conception, formation and development of military thought, the training of scientific cadres in the complex conditions of that time, and to show the difficulties in accomplishing the theoretical and practical tasks of strengthening the nation's defense capability.

This book does not claim to be an exhaustive presentation of the multifaceted history of Soviet military thought. This essay examines what in our view are the most important problems, resolution of which most faithfully reflects the general process of development of Soviet military-theoretical thought in 1917-1941. The material presented in this brief chronological account constitutes an attempt to construct a chronicle of military knowledge.

We consider this work to be a step toward producing a major collective-authorship, fully-encompassing study of the history of Soviet military thought. The author would like to express his sincere gratitude to all those persons who took part in preparing this volume for publication.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, page 14.

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2. CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "On the 50th Anniversary of the First Five-Year USSR National Economic Development Plan," KOMMUNIST, No 5, 1979, page 5.
3. K. Marks and F. Engel's, "Soch." [Writings], Second Edition, Vol 1, page 585.
4. For more detail on this see pp 221-234 [of original document].
5. A journal was published in 1919 under the same name by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front. In 1921-1922 Kiev Military District Headquarters published a monthly journal entitled "REVOLYUTSIONNAYA VOYENNAYA MYSL' [Revolutionary Military Thought].
6. VOYENNAYA MYSL' (Of the Turkestan Military District), Book 1, 1921, page 44. As the editors reported, articles ready for publication remained unpublished for an extended period of time due to technical difficulties.
7. VOYENNAYA MYSL' (Of the Turkestan Military District), Book 2, 1921.
8. Ibid., No 3, 1921, page 3.
9. Ibid., page 7.
10. He was referring to the central journals VOYENNAYA NAUKA I REVOLYUTSIYA [Military Science and Revolution] (1921-1922) and VOYENNAYA MYSL' I REVOLYUTSIYA [Military Thought and Revolution] (1922-1924). Both journals were publications of the Republic Revolutionary Military Council.
11. M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Writings], Vol 2, Moscow, 1957, page 307.
12. Ibid., pp 306-307.
13. "Order of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense No 8 of 5 March 1945," VOYENNAYA MYSL', No 1-2, 1945, page 95.
14. Novikov, A. I., "Leninizm i progressivnyye traditsii russkoy obshchestvennoy mysli" [Leninism and the Progressive Traditions of Russian Social Thought], Leningrad, 1965; Ye. G. Plimak, "Social Thought as a Subject of Historical Investigation," "Filosofskie problemy istoricheskoy nauki" [Philosophical Problems of Historical Science], Moscow, 1969; B. A. Chagin, "Ocherk istorii sotsiologicheskoy mysli v SSSR (1917-1969)" [Outline of History of Sociological Thought in the USSR (1917-1969)], Leningrad, 1971; "Istoriya obshchestvennoy mysli. Sovremennyye problemy" [History of Social Thought. Contemporary Problems], Moscow, 1972; "Aktual'nyye problemy istorii obshchestvennoy mysli" [Current Problems of History of Social Thought], issues 1-4, Moscow, 1973-1974.
15. VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 7, 1975, page 162.
16. Ibid., No 5, 1977, page 135.

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17. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 1, page 419.
18. Ibid., Vol 25, page 112.
19. "Leninskiy sbornik" [Lenin Collection], XI, page 385.
20. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 33, page 99.
21. Marks and Engel's, op. cit., Vol 39, page 83.
22. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 29, page 207.
23. See ibid., page 162.
24. Ibid., page 79.
25. Ibid., page 321.
26. Ibid., Vol 2, page 178.
27. "Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1971, page 88.
28. Marks and Engel's, op. cit., Vol 20, page 370.
29. Ibid., Vol 11, page 437.
30. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 30, page 351.
31. Ibid.
32. Korotkov, I., "Military-Scientific Journals as a Historical Source," VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 1, 1970, pp 83-91.
33. Marks and Engel's, op. cit., Vol 23, page 29.

Historiography of the Subject

Everybody who studies the history of the origination and development of Soviet military thought turns first of all to the works of those authors who have investigated this subject. Scholarly interest in the works of one's predecessors is determined by the necessity of elucidating and demonstrating the extent to which the problem as a whole has been treated and discussed, as well as individual aspects of the problem.¹

In the 1920's and 1930's there were no special studies synthesizing the history of the formation and development of Soviet military thought; there were only a few addresses in which initial steps in this area were discussed. We shall recall a speech by M. V. Frunze, dedicated to the 6th anniversary of the Military Academy of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (7 December 1924)²; articles by A. S. Bubnov and S. I. Gusev on the theoretical and practical activities of M. V. Frunze following the Civil War³; special studies by young scientists A. M. Vol'pe and A. V. Golubev,

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which examined the military-theoretical views of M. V. Frunze and his practical work in the armed forces.⁴ These studies can be considered the beginning of elaboration of the history of Soviet military thought.

First attempts at studying the history of the art of warfare of the entire postwar period were undertaken at the beginning of the 1940's. The "History of the Civil War in the USSR and the Red Army" program (1940) contained 12 new topics dealing with military history of the postwar period. Study of Soviet military thought of the 1920's and 1930's began with the military reform of 1924-1925. The theoretical principles of the military reform elaborated by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), problems of military doctrine, Red Army regulations, and the experience of field maneuvers were to be investigated. Scholars pointed to the necessity of noting the temporary technical backwardness of the Red Army in the 1920's and the beginning of theoretical elaboration of the fundamentals of technical reconstruction. The following specific topics were examined: technical equipment of the Red Army (1928-1933); changes in organization and armament, technical equipment and combat training of the Red Army (1933-1938).

Red Army combat operations and campaigns were designated as special topics: rout of the White Manchurian troops on the Chinese Eastern Railroad (1929), rout of the Japanese forces at Lake Khasan (1938) and the Japanese-Manchurian forces in the Khalkhin-Gol area (1939), and the liberation campaign into the Western Ukraine and Belorussia (1939). The experience of military operations in the Soviet-Finnish War (1939-1940) was examined in four volumes.⁵

Thus essentially the entire course of the history of Soviet art of warfare in the years between the wars was encompassed in this program. Students studied this course on the basis of lectures and temporary-type textbooks.

Work on publishing a permanent-type textbook on history of wars and the art of warfare began in the latter half of the 1930's. It included a separate chapter on development of Soviet art of warfare following the Civil War. Prior to publication of this textbook, there existed a certain lack of coordination and subjectivism in teaching art of warfare at service academies.⁶ The authors of the new textbook encountered a number of difficulties: a lack of studies treating in detail the military-theoretical theses of the founders of Marxism, as well as a lack of summary appraisals on Red Army tactics and operational art in the Civil War.⁷

The new textbook was the first to examine the combat experience of the Red Army in the border military conflicts of 1921-1938, as well as the experience of field exercises and maneuvers. Matters pertaining to new tactical forms of combat as expressed in regulations and field manuals were discussed. In particular, high praise was given to the 1929 Field Service Regulations, which laid down the fundamentals of the battle in depth. The correct premises of the field service regulations, however, could not be realized, since the troops lacked realistic material capabilities for their implementation.⁸

During the course of the Great Patriotic War the entire attention of military historians and theorists was naturally concentrated on study of the current combat experience of the Red Army and Navy, as well as the enemy's combat experience. Therefore the period between wars was touched upon only in a few articles published in the military theoretical journal in connection with the 30th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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After the war history of the art of warfare was given considerable recognition at the service academies. Command faculties allocated 220 hours to lectures and seminars, with 120 hours allocated for engineering faculties. In 1949 study of the art of warfare of the period between wars was included in the history of art of warfare course taught at the Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin. Of the military events of 1921-1940, combat operations at Lake Khasan and Khalkhin-Gol (Mongolian People's Republic) and the Soviet-Finnish War were examined. The field exercises and maneuvers of those years were not discussed at all. Nor were the theoretical writings of Soviet authors examined.

The first regular typeset course on history of the Soviet art of warfare, 1917-1940, was published after the Great Patriotic War.⁹ This course examined Red Army combat operations in border conflicts. Because of the conditions of that time, the author was unable to show the actual inception and development of Soviet military thought: he failed to mention the names of many outstanding Soviet military theorists and to reveal the diversity of problems of Soviet art of warfare. Other authors as well, for this same reason, were unable to reveal the actual process of development of Soviet art of warfare and the Soviet Armed Forces.¹⁰

The 1951 draft curriculum in history of the art of warfare stated that in teaching and investigating history of the art of warfare one must proceed from recognition of the struggle of views and freedom of criticism.¹¹ The actual content and thrust of textbooks on history of the art of warfare of that time failed to reflect this demand.

The events of the latter half of the 1950's became turning points in study of the history of Soviet social thought. The 20th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee, condemning the manifestation of the cult of personality in the past,¹² created a favorable atmosphere for investigation of the history of Soviet military thought.

Soon after the 20th CPSU Congress a small study was published, in which Soviet operational-tactical views of the 1920's and 1930's were examined with inclusion of the writings of military theorists and the materials of maneuvers and field exercises in the discussion.¹³

History of Soviet military-theoretical thought of the period between wars was investigated considerably more extensively in the 1960's. The second edition of the monograph "Soviet Military Science" contained a separate chapter dealing with its inception and development.¹⁴ Special chapters began to be devoted to history of Soviet military science in major studies.¹⁵

Some studies pointed to the difficulty of formation of Marxist methodology, which was taking place in the struggle with bourgeois views. Trotskyites and some czarist military experts championed these views in the 1920's.¹⁶ The party's struggle against apostates from the Lenin line in military organizational development is also reflected in a monograph dealing with the history of party organizational development.¹⁷

Certain questions pertaining to history of the art of warfare in the period between wars were more fully discussed in the 1960's. The well-known study "Military Strategy," three editions of which were published (1962, 1963, 1968), contained a

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special chapter entitled "Development of Soviet Military Strategy (1917-1945)," in which the history of Soviet strategy thinking was examined in a concise manner.¹⁸ A special study by V. A. Semenov dealt with the history of Soviet operational thinking, in which the author demonstrated that the term "operativnoye iskusstvo" [operational art] began to be employed in our literature in the 1920's.¹⁹

After the 20th CPSU Congress there began extensive publication of the writings of famous Civil War military leaders and military theorists whose writings continue to be of value for the history of military thought. The literary legacy of S. S. Kamenev includes articles, lectures, and speeches on theoretical and practical matters pertaining to the art of warfare. His book contained selected articles, which, in the opinion of the author of the preface, A. I. Todorskiy, will be of interest, "because they contain the rich experience of an important military leader."²⁰

Of considerable interest is the authoritative testimony of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic on the military activities of V. I. Lenin during the Civil War years, on the novelty and breadth of his military views, and on Lenin's gifted solving of problems of strategy. "The question of where the Red Army's main axis of advance should be, and where the secondary axis should be unquestionably should be determined by he who directed the country's overall policy."²¹ This precise evaluation of Lenin's military leadership was first published in 1934.

M. V. Frunze was one of the Red Army's most brilliant proletarian commanders, who made an enormous contribution to the development of Soviet military thought and practical military organizational development from the position of Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist homeland. Profound knowledge of theory of Marxism-Leninism and his wealth of experience acquired during the Civil War years also found embodiment in his activities as a military theorist of a new, socialist type.

Frunze's principal service in elaboration of problems of military theory was comprehensive application of the theses of Marxism-Leninism to the problems of preparing for and conducting a war in defense of socialism. Therefore efforts by the command of the Military Academy of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (following the death of M. V. Frunze, named after him) to publish the writings of this military leader in three volumes (1926-1929) and in 1957 in two volumes -- was natural.²²

The two-volume selected writings of M. V. Frunze contained new archival documents connected with Frunze's activities in the post of military commissar of the Yaroslavl' Military District (1918), as well as rare materials (previously published) -- speeches by A. S. Bubnov and I. S. Unshlikht at a meeting at the Military Academy of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army on 1 November 1925, I. V. Stalin's speech at the funeral of M. V. Frunze on 3 November, and an article by K. Ye. Voroshilov which appeared in the 31 October 1926 issue of PRAVDA. At the same time we should acknowledge that Frunze's collected writings published in 1926-1929, which has become a bibliographic rarity, has remained up to the present time the most complete collection of his writings, although its incompleteness was noted even at that time. The compilers expressed the hope that there would subsequently be published a fuller edition of M. V. Frunze's writings. Unfortunately this has not yet come to pass.

M. N. Tukhachevskiy was an important Red Army official who made a large contribution to development of Soviet military theory and practical armed forces organizational development. He wrote and published more than 120 papers. A two-volume edition of his selected writings contains 21 papers.²³

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The preface to this edition, written by former chief of the General Staff S. S. Biryuzov, contains an analysis of the theoretical legacy of this prominent Soviet military leader. The preface is interesting chiefly because it utilizes new materials which characterize Tukhachevskiy as a bold military commander in bringing before the party Central Committee and Soviet Government a number of important problems pertaining to national defense. Revealed in his activities were the traits of an innovative worker who combined theory with practice, who had the ability to see the development trend in military affairs. These and many other facts presented in the preface supplement Tukhachevskiy's Selected Works and reveal his role in the history of Soviet military thought and in strengthening the nation's defense capability.²⁴ One acknowledgment of the considerable merits of Soviet military theorists of the 1920's and 1930's is publication of two substantial collected volumes of their scholarly writings on strategy, operational art, and tactics. One of these contains writings by 39 authors,²⁵ while the other contains 46, plus excerpts from four collective-authorship works prepared by service academies.²⁶ The materials contained in these volumes give a general picture of the status of theory of Soviet art of warfare.

One must mention in particular the prefaces to each volume, written by M. V. Zakharov, former chief of the General Staff. The introductory articles comprise independent investigations in history of Soviet strategic and operational-tactical thought. They utilize some new materials (unfortunately without references to sources). Some theses, in our opinion, are debatable. The serious crisis of bourgeois military science in the 1920's and 1930's is noted, for example. As proof the author makes reference to the theories of de Gaulle, Seeckt, Soltan and others, which were quite widespread at that time, on the expediency of establishing small, well-equipped, elite professional armies.

The author also cites the views of Douhet and Fuller, who exaggerated the significance of some one type of weapon in war (aviation and tanks). But statement of the widespread nature of these theories is promptly reversed: "In actuality none of the capitalist countries followed the course of these modernist theories."²⁷

The fact is that these were normal conflicts in views, which did not keep official bourgeois doctrines of these European countries from preaching preparation for war with the participation of mass armies and all combat arms and branches.

The compilers of these volumes made a significant contribution toward elaboration of the history of Soviet military thought of the period between wars with their commentary on the articles and information on their authors, as well as with inclusion of a brief survey of the best-known Soviet writings on strategy, operational art and tactics in the period 1917-1940 which were not included in the volumes, as well as information on their authors.

Of considerable value for amassing material on history of Soviet military thought are articles published in VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL (VIZh) which contain factual material on various aspects of history of the art of warfare of the 1920's-1930's.²⁸

Studies dealing with history of the art of warfare predominate in literature of the latter half of the 1950's and 1960's dealing with history of Soviet military thought in the period between wars. A broader range of aspects of military theory and

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practical armed forces organizational development in the 1920's and 1930's was investigated only in studies by a few authors.²⁹

Work on history of Soviet military-theoretical thought was intensified to a significant degree in connection with the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution, the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the V. I. Lenin Birth Centennial.

Soviet military leaders I. Kh. Bagramyan, P. F. Batitskiy, K. A. Vershinin, M. V. Zakharov, N. I. Krylov, V. F. Margelov, I. G. Pavlovskiy, I. T. Paresypkin, P. P. Poluboyarov, K. F. Skorobogatkin and others published articles in the central military journals on problems pertaining to history of the armed forces branches and combat arms and theory of their employment in the prewar years. Two theoretical conferences dealt with the history of Soviet military thought: "Fifty Years of Soviet Military Science" (organized in 1967 by the General Staff); "Problems of Methodology of Soviet Military-Historical Science" (prepared by the Institute of Military History).

Interest in synthesis of the history of Soviet military thought became heightened in the 1970's, in connection with the V. I. Lenin Birth Centennial. Interesting studies were published, meriting particular attention among which is N. N. Azovtsev's study entitled "V. I. Lenin and Soviet Military Science."

The Leninist military-theoretical legacy is examined in this book. A separate chapter deals with innovative development of the Lenin legacy in the area of military theory; the author shows the activities of the Communist Party, military leaders and military theorists in armed forces organizational development and development of theory of the art of warfare during the years between wars. In researching this period the author relied on the military-theoretical theses of V. I. Lenin, the resolutions of party congresses and CPSU Central Committee decisions on military matters, and showed the development of these theses in the writings of Soviet authors of the 1920's and 1930's.³⁰

A work was published in 1973 on the history of the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze, our oldest service academy, written by a large team of instructors and professors. This book discusses the history of training of scientific cadres and preparation of military-theoretical studies during the entire history of the academy.³¹ The authors present the complex situation of the 1920's at one of the scholarly centers of Soviet military thought. Frequently sharp debates would arise during class between students and instructors.³² The book contains new facts from the history of the academy.

One would object, however to some of the authors' appraisals and conclusions. It is asserted, for example, that "in 1923-1925 military-scientific work at the academy was firmly established on a Marxist-Leninist foundation."³³ Such a conclusion is not confirmed by the preceding pages, while the succeeding pages contradict the authors' statement: "Antiscientific interpretations of certain problems were encountered in lectures on socioeconomic subject matter."³⁴ Even in January 1930, it is evident from the book, the academy was not backing up its curriculum with fully acceptable textbooks in the principal military disciplines.³⁵

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Establishment of solid Marxist-Leninist principles in scientific research would more accurately date from the beginning of the 1930's.³⁶

Another group-authorship work produced at the Institute of Military History examines the theory and practice of party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces from their establishment up to the present day.³⁷ One notes a close link between the history of party-political work in the 1920's-1930's and the general tasks of armed forces organizational development and the party's struggle against Trotskyite and other anti-Leninist views in the military area.

Publication of B. M. Shaposhnikov's book indicates the definite interest on the part of Voenizdat in one of the founders of Soviet military theory. In the extensive preface to this work Mars SU A. M. Vasilevskiy and M. V. Zakharov note the enormous role played by B. M. Shaposhnikov in elaboration of many concrete problems pertaining to armed forces organizational development.³⁸ Unfortunately the volume does not contain all the theoretical studies of B. M. Shaposhnikov. V. M. Zakharov's pamphlet entitled "Scientist and Warrior"³⁹ constitutes a supplement to his description as a military theorist. It contains some new materials from the life and career of this outstanding military leader and theorist.

The state of Soviet military thought in the prewar years is discussed in a concise manner in the second volume of the major work "History of World War II, 1939-1945."⁴⁰ The authors examine military theory in a close link with the practical business of training troops and staffs; they give the names of theorists who made a definite contribution to development of Soviet military thought; they present a general appraisal of the achievements of Soviet military theory during this period.

An important place in study of the history of Soviet military thought is held by a volume written by a team of authors at the Institute of Military History.⁴¹ This study makes the first attempt to trace the origin and development of Soviet military-historical science over a period of more than half a century. Reviews of this work contained critical comments and suggestions. In particular, it was recommended in analyzing military theory of the 1920's and 1930's that one indicate how the ideas of research studies were reflected in field service regulations.⁴²

Among books published in the 1970's, a study by a team of authors from the General Staff Academy represents an important piece of investigation.^{42a} This study deals with one of the most complex problems of military theory -- the initial period of a war. The authors examine the question of nations' entry into war on the basis of historical experience, beginning with the 19th century. The authors analyze in particular detail the experience of the first campaigns and operations of World War II. The works of Soviet military theorists of the 1930's are extensively utilized for discussion of this problem. Another valuable element in this research is the fact that in studying the views of Soviet authors on the character of the initial period of a war, a comparison is given with the statements of bourgeois authors, and the authors show the deeper and more comprehensive prognosis of Soviet military theorists in resolving this problem on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.

The state of historiography of Soviet military thought of the period between wars enables one to reach the conclusion that it is possible in subsequent work to rely on a certain historiographic foundation. The considerable work accomplished in this area, however, constitutes merely a first step. No monograph has yet been

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published which fully discusses any one period of the history of development of Soviet military thought.

The level achieved in investigation of this subject enables one to proceed with a deeper study of such problems as determination of the subject and content of history of Soviet military thought; problems pertaining to its division into periods; disclosure of the process of origination and development of the major problems of Soviet military thought at the different stages in its history; history of the training of military-scientific cadres; methods and methodology of scientific investigation of the history of military thought.

In our opinion one can now begin compiling a scholarly chronicle of the major events in the history of Soviet military thought. Accomplishment of this work will significantly facilitate execution of organizational-preparatory measures pertaining to producing basic studies on history of Soviet military thought.

Thus what has been accomplished by military historians and theorists in the area of investigation of the history of Soviet military thought creates a certain scientific "backlog" for transition to the following stage of investigation -- writing of monographs on individual periods in the history of Soviet military thought.

As in any enterprise, however, there are also weak points in elaboration of the history of military thought. Certain shortcomings in research methods are discovered in studying historical and theoretical works the authors of which address to one degree or another the history of Soviet military thought. An important demand of Marxist-Leninist dialectics is not always observed -- that the development of social thought be examined in movements, in the struggle of ideas and views. Some studies fail to disclose the complex process of origination and development of military thought. Such a view is encountered both in special studies⁴³ and in works in which the development of military-theoretical thought is reflected briefly, in the form of small subsections.⁴⁴ The impression is created that the development of military theory took place without a struggle of opinions. Such a presentation simplifies the historical process and shows it as a path of easy solutions to the most highly complex problems of national defense, which in actuality was not and could not be the case.

We must also mention another shortcoming in investigation of the history of Soviet military thought -- its anonymity. As we know, Soviet military thought was created and has developed thanks to collective efforts by our party's Central Committee, military leaders, top-echelon headquarters staffs, military academies, military-scientific organizations, and the military press. But the collective nature of the creation and development of Soviet military theory by no means excludes its concrete authors. Unfortunately, in some military-historical and theoretical studies various military ideas are sometimes presented without presenting the names of the theorists who were the first to state them. Subsequently these ideas experienced further development in other studies and were subsequently legalized in military regulations and field manuals.

Our press has pointed to this shortcoming. In the article "Some Problems of Military History in the Book 'Military Strategy'," for example, the book's compilers were criticized for the fact that they, in examining the state of theory of military strategy in the period between wars (1921-1941), while correctly referring to writings by M. V. Frunze, at the same time ignored the writings of other theorists.⁴⁵

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The authors responded to the criticism in a peculiar way: in subsequent editions they removed all references even to the writings of M. V. Frunze.⁴⁶ A similar method of investigation is also encountered in other studies. New archival materials, for example, were utilized in an interesting historical essay on the National Air Defense Forces. From the contents of the first stages of the section entitled "Elaboration of the Fundamentals of Combat Employment of Air Defense Forces," one could expect the author to discuss elaboration of theory of employment of air defense forces, with indication of the corresponding works and articles. The authors of the essay, however, did not feel it necessary to go beyond references to the appropriate points of military regulations and field manuals of that time.

One can of course also trace the development of various points of theory on the basis of regulations documents, but this excludes, as it were, the very process of development of theoretical views in authored studies or in speeches by officers and general officers at meetings and scientific conferences. And yet no genuine picture of the development of military theory can be obtained without discussing this process.

A special achievement of military theory is recorded in official regulations and field manuals. But "military-scientific thought should create and expand the theoretical foundation for prompt and timely refinement and refurbishing of military regulations and field manuals and should elaborate new forms and methods of troop training and indoctrination."⁴⁷ The continuity of development of military theory and practice is manifested in this.

FOOTNOTES

1. This survey does not include works on military theory published in the 1920's and 1930's; they are utilized as one of the sources of Soviet military thought.
2. M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Writings], Vol 2, Moscow, 1957, pp 171-174.
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Conclusion

The origin and development of Soviet military thought show that this process was evoked by the objective necessity of defense of the socialist state. In elaboration of military questions, the party Central Committee and Soviet Government assigned concrete tasks to military theory. Accomplishment of these tasks was effected by collective efforts. On the basis of instructions by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), military leaders, service academies and scientific research institutes of the People's Commissariat of Defense elaborated in detail the military-theoretical and technical aspects of resolving the problems of national defense. Scientists from all areas of military affairs took part in this.

The process of formation and development of Soviet military-theoretical views took place in a difficult and complex situation of the transition period from capitalism to socialism. This dictated a situation where correct conclusions of military theory, based on the developing socialist economy, could not always be implemented. For example, theory of the operation (battle) in depth, which was first elaborated in this country, could not find practical application in troop training in the

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1920's due to a lack of adequate equipment. Nevertheless the main policy line in theory of armed forces organizational development during the years between wars was focused on development of aviation and armored forces.

The conclusions and theoretical points of Soviet military science in the period between the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War are acknowledged on the whole as establishment of a solid theoretical foundation for successful conduct of Red Army military operations against the fascist aggressors. The CPSU Central Committee noted the services of Soviet military science and art of warfare among the conditions which promoted the victory of the Soviet people and its Armed Forces.¹

History of Soviet military thought rejects the views of bourgeois historians and ideologists, who represent the genesis and development of Soviet military science as simple borrowing from bourgeois military theorists.² The facts presented in this study confirm the opposite. Soviet military theory was born and developed on a fundamentally different -- Marxist-Leninist philosophical foundation, which constitutes one of the decisive factors which determine its progressive character and superiority over bourgeois military theory.

Our adversaries in the West would like to see the Soviet Armed Forces not led by the CPSU. Displaying such "concern," they consider impossible, for example, successful development of theory of military strategy under conditions of party control.³ Extensive participation by historians and theorists in discussing major problems of Soviet military science refutes this thesis. Activeness on the part of Soviet politicians, military people, and scientific cadres was caused by the endeavor to find the most optimal solutions, proceeding from the country's material and technical capabilities in the years under review.

Bourgeois ideologists and historians attempt to extol the services of Trotsky in organizational development of the Red Army and to present him as a champion of peace. Commenting on the debate on military doctrine and paths of Armed Forces development occurring in the Soviet Union, they praise Trotsky as an advocate of defensive war.⁴

The Bolshevik Party rejected Trotsky's defeatist policy. Addressing the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets (December 1920), V. I. Lenin resolutely condemned those who proposed waging solely a defensive war.⁵ The Soviet people and their Armed Forces are indoctrinated in a spirit of offensive actions against the aggressive forces of international imperialism.

Consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist philosophical foundation in military thought became the principal, determining element in the development of military thought in the 1920's and 1930's. "...Only the ideology of Marxism," stated V. I. Lenin, "constitutes a correct expression of the interests, point of view and culture of the revolutionary proletariat."⁶ The establishment of Soviet military theory took place on the basis of the experience of revolutionary battles by the Russian proletariat in three revolutions and the Civil War of 1918-1920, as well as the experience of World War I. Critical reappraisal of all values (including in the military area) from the position of the new ruling class does not signify refashioning of past military theories applicable to new tasks. Development of theory in any area proceeds by means of critical reworking of the legacy of the past, advancement and substantiation of new theses. Soviet military theory had its conception from the

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needs of defense or the achievements of the October Revolution, and therefore much from past military theory could not be adopted.

The entire course of development of Soviet military-theoretical thought also rejects the legend of bourgeois military historians and writers of memoirs on the "red imperialism" of the 1920's and 1930's. Its economic and political foundations were void of any predatory aims.

As the history of Soviet military thought shows, development of military theories took place in dependence on technological progress. In connection with technological discoveries in the military area, theory provided scientific substantiation for new forms and modes of combat and elucidated new trends in development of military affairs.

Acknowledging the decisive significance of the Marxist-Leninist method in Soviet military theory, one must distinguish the objective capabilities of the scientific method and the actual effectiveness of its application by military cadres of that time. One should also bear in mind that a uniform Marxist method does not exclude the possibility of productive debate, reflecting the differing state of preparedness of military theorists, their erudition, knowledge of concrete material, and especially mastery of Marxist-Leninist methodology.

The complexity of mastering the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism lay in the fact that a Communist philosophical outlook does not boil down to acquisition of a specific sum of knowledge by rote learning. The fact is that the military-theoretical foundations of Marxism-Leninism must be transformed into deep personal conviction, and one must have the ability to apply them in investigating military problems or in accomplishing new practical tasks of military organizational development. The first generation of Marxist scientific cadres, in spite of their small numbers, succeeded in overcoming the bourgeois onslaught in the area of military theory and in finding a correct solution to the major problems of the 1920's.

The party developed scientific cadres who raised military theory to a high level, which strengthened the defense might of the Soviet Union. Soviet experience shows that it is possible to master Marxism-Leninism only under the guidance of a Marxist party, on the basis of thorough study of the Lenin military-theoretical legacy.

The instructiveness of the history of Soviet military-theoretical thought in the period between wars lies in the fact that the pages of this history tell of the ability of military theorists and practical workers to elucidate and solve the long-range problems of national defense.

Soviet experience confirms the usefulness of extensive, productive debate. In the course of debate there took place a vigorous struggle to ensure the party-mindedness as military theory, for assimilation of the Marxist-Leninist military-theoretical legacy, with discussion of new tasks of armed forces organizational development. Bourgeois and Menshevik-Trotskyite views in the military area were defeated in open struggle.

Soviet experience in the military area is of great international significance in a theoretical and practical respect. It convinces us that it is impossible to emerge victorious and to defend revolutionary achievements in armed conflicts with imperialism without the forming of proletarian Marxist-Leninist military theory.

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This experience shows to peoples which have taken the socialist road of development or which are fighting for their independence, the direction to take in establishing military-scientific cadres and military theory on a Marxist-Leninist philosophical and methodological foundation. Resolution of these problems will be immeasurably easier with an effort by all socialist countries. The main historical conclusion in this area is that without Marxist-Leninist training of young military-scientific cadres originating in the laboring classes, and without enlisting and reeducating old-order military experts, it is impossible to establish military science on a Marxist philosophical foundation.

Soviet military history teaches us how important it is not to ignore the main trend in development of military affairs in a period of temporary difficulties in providing an army with equipment. Soviet prewar experience indicates that a country's combat readiness and fighting efficiency depend on many factors, including material capabilities, prompt and timely replacement of obsolete military equipment, and preparation of army and people for a possible war.

Revolutionary Russia passed the first critical test during the years of intervention and civil war. The Soviet Union confirmed its ability to defend the achievements of the Great October Revolution during the Great Patriotic War.

Almost 40 years have passed since the most recent events investigated in this book. Enormous qualitative changes have taken place in the development of weapons and combat equipment, changes which caused a revolution in military affairs. The old problems of armed forces combat readiness were restated and received possible solution. "Comprehensive investigation of the most important problems of strategy, operational art and tactics," wrote Mar SU N. V. Ogarkov, chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, "is assuming great importance today."

Economic, scientific-technical, moral and military potentials possess great importance for increasing the combat power and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. All this makes it necessary to broaden the scientific investigation front, with closer coordination of scientific investigations with research in the area of the social, natural and technical sciences.

Based on Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, Leninist teaching on defense of the socialist homeland, Soviet officers, general officers and flag officers seek more deeply to analyze the specific features of contemporary war, to advance military theory and practice, and to do everything necessary to achieve further strengthening of this country's defense might and to improve the state of continuous combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces, guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

FOOTNOTES

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3. P. Herrick, "Soviet Naval Strategy," Annapolis, U.S. Naval Institute, 1968.
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5. See V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 42, page 173.
6. Ibid., Vol 41, page 337.
7. N. Ogarkov, "Soviet Military Science," PRAVDA, 19 February 1978.

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